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Comments
EFFECTs OF THE CIVIL CODE UPON PLEADINGS AND METHODS OF TRIAL IN
"CIVIL ACTION" FOR INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES
When the lawyer prepares a case in which his client seeks to obtain an in-
junction and damages, he is faced with historical, theoretical, and practical dif-
ficulties both in the framing of his pleadings and in the trial of the case. Should
the petition contain only one count, or should separate counts be set forth for
the injunction and the damages sought? Whatever may be the answer to that
question, there will remain the possibility that, if the injunction is denied, the
(161)
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defendant may insist that there is a constitutional right that the issue of damages
be tried by a jury rather than by the court. Faced with these problems, just how
should the lawyer proceed? It is important to remember that the question is not
whether one may obtain both an injunction and damages in the same action, but
is rather what is the safest and best mode of proceeding?
Whatever rule might have prevailed in England," or in other of the United
States,2 and whatever rule might have developed in Missouri had a code of civil
procedure not been enacted, the plain fact is that the courts of Missouri, in what
they have considered to be appropriate cases, have awarded damages in addition
to injunctions" and damages in lieu of injunctions.4 When faced with petitions
for such relief, our appellate courts consistently: (1) have insisted that, though
there is now only one form of action, the substantive distinctions between law
and equity remain as clear as they ever were; and (2) have relied upon the prin-
ciple of "the totality of jurisdiction" of equity to sustain the awarding of damages
in addition to injunctive relief.
What effect does this distinction between "law" and "equity" have on the
problem of drafting the petition? Once the petition is properly drafted, the serious
problem remaining is that of trial procedure, resulting from this same distinction and
from the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of trial by jury.6
The principle of "totality of jurisdiction" as applied in the Missouri courts
may be briefly stated as follows. If a plaintiff alleges and proves facts entitling
him to an injunction, the court, as a court of equity, will not only grant the in-
junction, but will retain the case and award in addition such damages as the
plaintiff proves.6 Further, if an injunction is denied because of impossibility or
futility which is not the fault of the plaintiff, the court, still as a court of equity,
will retain the case to award damages as a substitute for the injunction.7 On the
1. Discussions may be found in ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITY, Bk. II,
c. VI (4th Am. ed. 1859); and in 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUIrY JURISPRUDENCE
c. 23 (5th ed. 1849).
2. See POMEROY, EQuIrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 236, 237 (1907).
3. Ware v. Johnson, 55 Mo. 500 (1874) (trespass); Paddock v. Somes, 102
Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890) (nuisance); Downing v. Dinwiddie, 132 Mo. 92, 33
S.W. 470 (1895) (nuisance); Whipple v. McIntyre, 69 Mo. App. 397 (1897) (nuis-
ance); Baker v. McDaniel, 178 Mo. 447, 77 S.W. 531 (1903) (nuisance); Scheurich
v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (1905) (nuisance);
Geltz v. Amsden, 125 Mo. App. 592, 102 S.W. 1037 (1907) (nuisance); Schopp v.
Schopp, 162 Mo. App. 558, 142 S.W. 740 (1912) (waste); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
v. State Highway Commission, 322 Mo. 419, 17 S.W. 2d 535 (1929) (nuisance);
St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Hoban, 209 S.W. 2d 119 (Mo. 1948) (tres-
pass and conversion).
4. Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo. App. 229, 89 S.W. 577 (1905) (nuisance);
Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Dalzell, 205 Mo. App. 207, 223 S.W. 786 (1920)
(violation of trust).
1948).
5. Mo. CoNsT. ART. I, § 22; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN § 847.98 (Supp. 1948).
6. Cases cited in note 1, supra, especially Downing v. Dinwiddie.
7. Note 2, supra.
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other hand, the repeatedly pronounced rule is that if the plaintiff fails to prove
himself entitled to an injunction, the court no longer has any jurisdiction as a court
of equity and so may not award damages.8 (It will be remembered that when
law and equity were administered by separate courts or were treated as separate
systems, a refusal of an injunction normally resulted in the dismissal of the cause
by the court of equity). The claim for damages is then held to be a legal claim, and
one may not proceed in an equitable action to enforce a legal demand; 9 to do so
would deprive the defendant of his right to trial by jury.'0
It is thus readily apparent that there is in this connection no serious problem if
one is certain of proving beyond doubt his right to the injunction, as, for example,
when the existence of a nuisance has been established in a previous action."
But it is also clear that very serious problems arise when one is not sure of
being able to prove his right to the injunction. There are two overlapping objectives:
(1) a plaintiff in this position will want to assure himself of a hearing on his
claim for damages. (2) As far as possible, a plaintiff will want to be sure of
getting the entire dispute settled in one action.12 The lawyer's first problem is to
draft a petition best designed to secure these results. Following that is the prob-
lem of planning the most effective and economical mode of trial in the face of the
constitutional right of trial by jury.'8 We shall first consider the problem of
drafting the petition.
We have found no Missouri cases on the point decided prior to the original
code of procedure, but it seems clear that it would then have been permissible
8. Baker v. McDaniel, Geltz v. Amsden, Schopp v. Schopp, Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. State Highway Commission, supra, note 1; Krummenacher v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 206 S.W. 2d 991 (Mo. App. 1948); reversed. 217 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo.
1949); Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. App. 1948);
Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. American Taxicabs, 344 Mo. 1200, 130 S.W.
2d 601 (1939); Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Winn, 233 Mo. App. 26, 116 S.W. 2d 550
(1938).
9. Note, for example, the statement by supreme court in the Krummen-
acher case, supra, note 8, "In ruling this case the St. Louis Court of Appeals
held that a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to render a judgment for a
plaintiff on legal issues in the absence of a finding that some equitable right of
the plaintiff has also been violated. We approve that holding. It is supported
by the decisions of this court." (Citing: Miller v. St. Louis & K.C. Ry., 162
Mo. 424, 63 S.W. 85 (1901); Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. State Highway Commission,
322 Mo. 419, 17 S.W. 2d 535 (1929); and Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v.
American Taxicabs, 344 Mo. 1200, 130 S.W. 2d 601 (1939).
10. Continuing the remarks quoted in note 9, the court said, "To hold
otherwise would permit a plaintiff to ambush a defendant in that a plaintiff
could plead a cause of action in equity and also seek legal damages and then
fail to prove that he was entitled to any equitable relief. He would thereby deprive
defendant of a trial by a jury."
11. Paddock v. Somes, supra, note 3; the court says, "The question of
nuisance has been established at law, and where this has been done, the courts will
grant an injunction as a matter of course, where, as here, such nuisance is of a
continuous, or constantly recurring, character." But see note 15, infra, and the text
there referred to.
12. Mo. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 847.37 (Supp. 1948).
13. Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 22. See Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.98 (Supp. 1948).
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to proceed in two separate and successive actions. A plaintiff might have sued
first in equity for an injunction only and then, upon the termination, either favorably
or unfavorably, of that suit, might have filed his suit at law for damages. The
reverse would have been possible and perhaps required. Having found no cases, we
cannot say whether or not a plaintiff would have been required to establish the
existence of the ground for injunction in an action at law before filing his bill for
the injunction in equity. There seems no reason for doubt, however, that he would
have been permitted to do so.
This approach appears to have been permissible also under the former pro-
cedural statutes,' 4 and is probably still permissible. There is at least a possibility,
however, that the rule of res judicata will be applied. If one may ask for both an
injunction and damages in the same action, isn't he bound to do so? Isn't it possible
that a decision on one or the other will be held to operate as an adjudication of
the entire dispute?1 5 In any event, this approach requires two actions, which,
for reasons of time and costs, is one of the things one should be most anxious to
avoid.
Before adoption of the Civil Code of Missouri in 1943, the surest and safest
plan clearly was to draft the petition in two counts, the first stating a claim, "form-
erly equitable," for an injunction, and the second stating a claim, "formerly legal,"
for damages. In deciding a case in 1933 the Missouri Supreme Court expressly re-
ferred to this method of pleading as the correct one.16 Further, in a recent case,
decided since adoption of the 1943 code, the Kansas City Court of Appeals held
that such a petition got before the court both claims, that plaintiff had a right to be
heard on both claims, and that it was therefore error to dismiss the separate count
for damages even though no right to an injunction under the first count was es-
tablished. 17 It would appear safe to reverse the order of the counts, if that is de-
14. See note 11, supra.
15. Experience in New York, for example, indicates the possibility of this
result. Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901); City of Syracuse v. Hogan,
243 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923). These cases are cited and discussed in WALSH,
Egurry p. 113 (1930). See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING pp. 475-476 (2d ed. 1947),
citing many authorities. But of. under the former procedural statutes in Mis-
souri, Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Winn, and Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v.
American Taxicabs, supra, note 8, in which were cited Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
v. State Highway Commission, supra, note 1; Ebel v. Roller, 21 S.W. 2d 214 (Mo.
App. 1929); Modem Woodmen of America v. Cummins, 216 Mo. App. 404, 268
S.W. 383 (1925). See also, Rose v. Houser (1947), note 17, infra.
16. In Minor v. Burton, 228 Mo. 558, 128 S.W. 946 (1910), the petition
was drawn in three counts, one for quiet title, one in trespass for damages, and
one in equity for an injunction. The court in Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon, 333
Mo. 817, 68 S.W. 2d 814 (1933), said that the petition in Minor v. Burton was an
example of the correct practice.
17. Rose v. Houser, 206 S.W. 2d 571 (Mo. App. 1947), "It is manifest that
the portion of the judgment disposing of the plaintiffs' claim for damages was
unauthorized. The fact that they were not entitled to equitable relief does not
deprive them of the right to pursue any legal remedy that might be available."
Plaintiff had asked in one count for an injunction to restrain the further mainten-
ance of a nuisance, and in count two for damages on account of the nuisance.
Trial court had denied the injunction and dismissed the entire petition.
4
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sired, setting forth in the first the claim for damages and in the second the claim
for an injunction, though we have found no cases in which this was done. Such
a petition, again, will surely get both claims before the court and the defendant18
Whichever order is selected, it seems clear that the two-count petition, getting both
claims before the court, will assure the plaintiff of a hearing on his claim for
damages and, so far as that may be done by pleadings, get the entire dispute
settled in one action.
Our courts, however, have continued to talk of "law" and of equity," the
theory of the two-count petition evidently being that it joined two causes of action,
one "legal" and one "equitable." 19
What then is the theory of the petition drawn in one count, asking for both
an injunction and damages? Prior to the adoption in 1943 of the Civil Code of
Missouri, our courts consistently treated such a petition as stating only one
cause of action. Usually the courts said that the distinctions between law and
equity were to be preserved and that the one-count petition therefore stated a
cause of action in equity.20 On this theory it was, of course, simply the modern
equivalent of a bill in equity, and was treated as such. This theory has also been
followed in some cases decided since the new code went into effect.21
In other cases before the new code, such one-count petitions were treated as
presenting civil actions for damages, with added prayers for injunctions.22 Some
reliance was placed on the statutory provision for a temporary injunction in a civil
18. But would not this practice tend to make a decree of injunction less
likely, than otherwise? Would not the court incline to award or deny the in-junction in accord with the verdict on the issue of damages?
19. One should be sure, of course, that each count sets out all elements
of a cause of action; this was imperative under Mo. REv. STAT. § 917 (1939),
expressly requiring that the causes of action which were joined be separately
stated. This provision was interpreted to require a separate count for each cause.
In Terry v. Michalak, 319 Mo. 290, 3 S.W. 2d 701 (1928), count one asked specific
performance of a contract, and count two asked damages in the form of rents and
profits which plaintiff claimed to have lost because of defendant's wrongful with-
holding of the use and possession of the property. Upon holding that the
contract was too indefinite to be enforced specifically, the court dismissed the
entire petition, saying that the second count, as drawn, was merely incidental to
and dependent on the first. In other words, count two did not state a cause of
action. Mo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 847.98 (Supp. 1948) contains no such requirement
for separate statement. Quaere what will be the effects of this change?
20. Examples of cases in which the petition was regarded as stating one
cause "in equity" are Downing v. Dinwiddie, Baker v. McDaniel, Geltz v. Amsden,
and Schopp v. Schopp, supra, note 3; and Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Dalzell supra,
note 4.
21. See St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Hoban, supra, note 3, and
the St. Louis Court of Appeals decision in Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply
Co., supra, note 8.
22. Examples of the few cases in which such petitions were regarded as
stating "actions for damages with added prayers for injunctions" are Ware v.
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action23 It is not entirely dear whether the interpretation of this statutory pro-
vision limited it to temporary injunctions; at any rate, it appears that a temporary
injunction issued in such an action could later be made permanent if the facts war-
ranted doing so. 24 We have found no recent cases adopting this theory of the
petition.
In still other cases, the one-count petition for injunction and damages appears
to have been treated simply as stating claims properly enforceable in a civil action,
with no issue being made of the so-called distinctions between law and equity.25
Again, we have found no recent cases adopting this treatment of the petition. In
those cases in which it was adopted, the basis appears to have been the procedure
followed in the trial court, in all of them trial having been had to both the court
and a jury.
If the one-count petition is treated as the equivalent of a bill in equity, the
claim for damages is before the court only if the right to the injunction is estab-
lished.26 On the other hand, if it is treated as stating a civil action for damages with
an added request for an injunction, or as stating claims enforceable in a civil action
without regard to distinctions between law and equity, the object of getting both
claims before the court has been accomplished.
Interesting developments are presented by two recent decisions treating one-
count petitions as joining two causes of action, one in "equity" and one at "law."
In the first,2 7 plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain defendant from further
permitting surface water and silt to overflow plaintiff's land, damages for the injury
caused by the flow of water and silt, and damages for an alleged trespass committed
by defendant in running graders upon plaintiff's land in the process of leveling and
improving that of defendant. The parties, the trial court, and the St. Louis Court of
Appeals all treated the petition as combining two causes of action. Interestingly
enough, however, the St. Louis Court of Appeals said that had the allegations of
trespass not been in the petition, the one count would have set out only one cause
of action "in equity," so that a denial of the injunction would have precluded the
award of damages. Damages were awarded only for injury caused by the trespass.
The second of these decisions2s seems to go one step further. Plaintiff alleged in one
count that defendant maintained a parking lot in connection with its automobile
supply business and that the continuous traffic in and out of the lot caused such
noise and dust as to amount to a nuisance to plaintiff, who owned and occupied a
residence across the alley from the lot, and, further, that plaintiff's fence was con-
23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1664 (1939).
24. Paddock v. Somes, supra, note 3.
25. In Rankin v. Charless, 19 Mo. 490 (1854), and Paddock v. Somes, supra,
note 3, the court seemed unconcerned about whether the petitions stated causes
"at law" or causes "in equity."
26. See notes 8, 9, and 10, .rsupra.
27. Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., supra, note 8.
28. That of the supreme court in Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply
Co., supra, note 8.
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tinually being damaged by automobiles running into it. The St. Louis Court of
Appeals treated the petition as stating only one cause of action, the traditional one
"in equity," and ruled that upon denying the injunction the trial court lost juris-
diction. Thereafter the case was transferred to the supreme court,29 which reversed
the decision of the court of appeals and held that the petition joined two causes
of action, one at equity and one at law, which is permissible under Section 37 of the
new Code of Civil Procedure.
We submit that these recent cases represent an appreciable advancement in
the theory and practical treatment of the pleadings. They appear to lead to this
result: whatever theory of pleading is thought to be appropriate, and whether a
plaintiff drafts his petition in one count or in separate counts, he gets his claim
for an injunction and his claim for damages both before the court and is assured
of being heard on them both in the same action. There may remain, however, im-
portant differences in the problems of trial procedure, as we shall consider later.
We suggest also that it would be advisable to take a further step. It is notable
that our courts are still talking in terms of "law" and "equity." It is also evident
that the theory of the pleadings entertained by our courts is, apparently, based
on the old distinctions between law and equity. In other words, a petition is looked
upon as stating a cause of action at law, or a cause in equity, or as joining such
causes of action.8 0 This now appears true whether the petition is in one count
or in separate counts. What we suggest is that under our modem codes, this theory
should be abandoned and that a petition be regarded simply as stating the facts on
which the claims are based, and the relief to which plaintiff believes himself entitled.
In other words, we believe that one of the functions of a petition is to inform
the defendant of the claims being made against him and of the facts on which they
are based.8 1 So, if plaintiff requests an injunction and alleges facts which entitle
him to an injunction, what purpose is to be served by saying that he has stated
a cause of action in equity? Or if he alleges facts indicating a right to recover
damages, is anything gained by saying that he has filed an action at law? According
to the code he is in either case maintaining a civil action, and in either case he is
informing the court and the defendant of his claim and the grounds for it. And why
is not the same true if the plaintiff in his petition asks for both an injunction and
damages and alleges facts entitling him to both? 2 If all necessary facts are alleged,
29. Because it was thought to be one of first impression since the adoption
of the new code in 1943, to involve a vital question of procedure, and so to be of
general interest in the state.
30. See again Rose v. Houser, supra, note 17, and cases cited in notes 21, 27
and 28.
31. For a recent discussion of the functions of pleading, see Blume, Theory
of Pleading A Survey Including the Federal Rules, 47 Mica. L. REV. 297 (1949).
The discussion is largely historical, but some emphasis is accorded the "notice-
function" of pleading.
32. See Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.98 (Supp. 1948). Note also that § 37
of the code refers to joinder of claims; it says nothing about "causes of action."
See also CL.ARK, CODE PLEADING p. 445, n. 35 (2d ed. 1947) and text referred to.
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and request for both injunction and damages is made, the defendant will be suf-
ficiently informed, and talking about joinder of causes and distinctions between
law and equity will serve only to confuse all concerned. Why should we not say sim-
ply'that plaintiff is still maintaining a civil action, recognizing that he is stating
facts and asking for all the relief to which those facts entitle him.A8 That relief may
take the form of an injunction, plus or minus damages, or of damages, alone. That
would take care of the theory of the pleadings and leave us only the problem of
effective and economical trial procedure, in which the main difficulty will arise from
the constitutional provision preserving the right of trial by jury.84
In what ways, then, might the trial of such an action be handled? If the
petition is in two counts, the first obvious possibility is to hold separate and suc-
cessive trials of the two counts. So a first hearing might be had on the count for
an injunction, which would be to the court and much like an old suit in equity.
Then, upon the termination of that hearing, and whatever judgment resulted from
it, a jury might be called, the evidence presented anew, and a verdict taken on the
count for damages.85 This procedure, of course, would get the entire dispute settled,
but would hardly be the shortest or most economical available.
Secondly, no sound objection appears to trying both counts at the same time.
Thus, a jury might be called at the outset, and all the evidence on the issues of both
counts presented in one hearing. The verdict of the jury could then be taken on the
issue of damages, the court could decide the issue of injunction, and the judgment
would be for either or both depending on the facts proved. It would also seem that
the parties might waive the right to trial by jury and agree to try the issues c4 both
counts to the court alone at the same time. With or without the jury this proce
dure would probably require the agreement of both parties at the outset.80 Cer-
tainly if that agreement could be reached, it would be shorter and less expensive
than trying the two counts separately.
If the petition asks for the injunction and damages in one count, there are
again several possibilities. First, it would appear to be still permissible to proceed
initially with trial to the court, just as formerly would have been done in equity.
If this is done and if plaintiff proves his right to the injunction, the court has juris-
diction "in equity" and may dispose of all aspects of the dispute, including the
awarding of damages. 7 There is thus a chance of obtaining the maximum results
with the minimum expenditure of time. If proof of the right to an injunction fails,
33. Sections 4, 36, 37, 38 and 42, Civil Code of Missouri, seem entirely
consistent with the views we have suggested.
34. Mo. CONsT. Art I, § 22.
35. Rose v. Houser, supra, note 17.
36. At the trial of Rose v. Houser, evidence was offered to show damages
sustained as a result of the alleged nuisance. It was excluded on objection that
the claim for damages was not being tried at the time.
37. The latest decisions we have found-Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co.,
and Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., supra, note 8, appear to leave
this possibility intact.
8
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all is not lost. Prior to the supreme court's decision in the Krumrnenacther case, the
court, on denying the injunction, would dismiss the entire action; but the right to
file a new action for damages would remain.88 Since that decision, the plaintiff, on
failing to obtain his injunction, could probably insist that a jury be called and the
trial of the issue of damages proceed without the filing of a new action. This result
is indicated by the decision in that case that the one-count petition stated two
causes of action.
Secondly, such a one-count petition might be tried to both the court and a
jury.8 9 The court could then try the issue of injunction, take the verdict of the
jury on the issue of damages, and give judgment appropriate to the finding on
both of them. On the surface this method of trial looks like a convenient solution
of the problem. True, it involves the expense, time and risks incident to calling
a jury, but it does result in a hearing on the whole dispute and the disposal of all
issues in a single proceeding. When actions have been tried in this way, the cor-
rectness of the proceeding has not been questioned; 40 indeed, it logically could not
be. "Equitable" issues are thus tried as they traditionally have been; the "legal"
issues are tried by a jury, and no one's rights are violated. It appears, however,
that trial in this manner must be with the assent of all concerned. It has been held
error for a trial court to refuse to try an action as in equity rather than as at law
when plaintiff sought equitable relief.4 ' In other words, a party has a right not to
have an "equitable" action tried to a jury. This right was noted again in the
38. But see note 15, supra.
39. Perhaps some assistance might also be found in Civil Code of Missouri
§§ 108, 109 and 110, providing, briefly, that the court may direct issues and have them
tried by a jury. And see § 97 of the Code, providing that the court may order
separate trials. For a general discussion of trial procedure when "legal" and "equit-
able" issues are presented in the same action, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING, pp. 106-111,
163 (2d ed. 1947).
40. Rankin v. Charless, supra, note 25; Ware v. Johnson, Paddock v. Somes,
Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., supra, note 3.
41. Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon, supra, note 16. Plaintiff alleged that deeds
were invalid because of fraud, and in one count asked for quiet title and damages.
Defendants moved "to transfer the case to the equity docket," but the motion was
overruled and the cause tried to a jury. Judgment for plaintiff for title, possession
and damages was reversed, the court holding that it was error to refuse the de-
fendants' motion.
The result reached in Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon may have been re-
quired by Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution of 1875, which vested
the judicial power of the state in specified courts, "as to matters of law and
equity." Under that provision, it would seem that "matters of equity" would
have been required to be tried to the court as a matter of constitutional right.
The corresponding provision of the Constitution of 1945, Article V, Section 1,
however, merely states that, "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in,"
certain named courts. It mentions neither "matters of law" nor "matters of
equity." Has this change, which has eliminated all reference to "matters of
equity," made it possible for jury trials to be either permitted or required in the
so-called "equity" cases which were formerly triable by the court alone? For
results in other states, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed. 1947, Section 16, at
footnotes 70 and 71.
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supreme court's decision in the Krummenacher case.42 In that case, as we have
noted, the petition in one count asked for an injunction and damages. Both parties
and the trial court proceeded as if trying a cause in equity, but the trial court
awarded damages after denying the injunction. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the
defendant waived his right to jury trial by not demanding a jury. But the court
said that, since the proceeding had been treated as being one in equity for an in-
junction, defendant had no right to trial by jury, and a request for it would have
been overruled if made.
When the one-count petition is regarded as joining two causes of action, as
it could be treated since the developments of the Villanova Realty Co. case and the
Krummetocer case, it has in effect only one substantial difference from the stand-
ard two-count petition. The difference is that, if there is no agreement to the
contrary, the initial proceeding will be like a trial in equity, and the court, if it
awards the injunction, will also settle the issue of damages as a chancellor would
have done, and the "second cause" will simply vanish. Apart from the possibility of
this total result, the possible modes of trial when a one-count petition presents two
causes of action are the same as when a two-count petition does so.
If it is desired to try these "two causes of action" simultaneously, an agreement
to that effect will most likely be necessary. An express waiver of the right of jury
trial appears sufficient to show such agreement.43 Proceeding to trial before the
court without objection does not amount to agreement to try both claims at once.44
Again in this connection the Krummenacher case is interesting. The supreme court
held: (1) the one-count petition stated two causes of action, one "at law" and one
"in equity." (2) The proceeding which was had was on the cause "in equity," and
there was therefore no right to trial by jury and hence no waiver. We believe that
the true explanation of this apparent inconsistency is that, since there was no
agreement on any other procedure, the two causes of action were to be tried sep-
arately and successively. Thus the trial was on the first cause of action; that is, the
one for an injunction, and the denial of the injunction precluded the court from
awarding damages in the trial of that "cause of action." The next step, of course,
would have been a jury trial on the action for damages, and that is just what the
supreme court remanded the cause for.
Following these latest decisions, the soundest procedure would seem to be to
file the petition in one count for both the injunction and damages; and then, if the
right to an injunction is certain of proof, insist on beginning trial to the court alone
as a chancellor. Or, if proof of the right to the injunction is not certain, one should
seek an agreement upon a simultaneous trial of the issues of injunction and dam-
ages. The cautious lawyer may still wish to use the two-count petition, though it
no longer seems to have any advantage after the decision of the Krunmenac er
42. Supra, note S.
43. Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., supra, note 8.
44. Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., supra, note 8.
[Vol. 14
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1949], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/3
case, unless plaintiff wants to be certain of a jury trial on his claim for damages.45
If the "notice" theory of the petition, which we have suggested, were adopted,
one further step could logically be taken in connection with the trial procedure. If
we regarded the petition as stating claims enforceable in a civil action, we would en-
vision only one trial even though there might be more than one claim based on the
pleaded facts. One of those claims (that for damages) being of a type traditionally
triable to a jury, the constitutional guarantee of jury trial would apply. But, the
action being a civil action under the code, the provisions for waiver of jury trial
would also apply.46 Thus either party could insist upon a jury at the outset, and
if both proceeded to trial to the court without demanding a jury, the right to a jury
would be waived and the court could dispose of all issues.
We submit that this change would be a desirable one. It would make certain
the disposition of both the claim for an injunction and the claim for damages in
one action in all cases of this type. It would, moreover, deprive no one of his con-
stitutional right of jury trial, but would simply require him to assert that right if he
wanted to take advantage of it. No other way presents itself to us of making the
mode of procedure certain and at the same time keeping costs as low as practicable
and keeping the consumption of the courts' and litigants' time to a minimum.
The problems presented by these types of cases illustrate the fact that, no mat-
ter how much advance may be sought or made by the so-called "fusion" of law
and equity under our modern codes, questions as to pleading and as to jury trial
will always be with us. The pleading is a relatively simple one. The problem of jury
trial, which is based upon a constitutional requirement, is not so easily solved, but
is far from being insoluble.
OLEN W. BURNMTr
45. Notes 40 and 41, supra, and text there referred to. And see McCLiNrocK,
Ep2urrY p. 123, n. 14 (2d ed. 1948) and text referred to. If a defendant has a
right to a trial to the court without a jury when plaintiff asks for equitable
relief, it would seem that the only way a plaintiff can be reasonably sure of
having the issue of damages tried by a jury (and he may want a jury trial, in
some instances, on the idea that a jury may award higher damages) is to have
his claim for damages treated as a cause separate from his claim for an injunction.
The claim for damages being one traditionally triable to a jury, he may then
rely on the constitutional guarantee.
46. In addition to the former provisions (Mo. REv. STAT. § 1101 (1939),
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.98 (Supp. 1948) provides that a jury shall be deemed
waived if the parties enter upon trial before the court without objection. If the
theory which we suggest is not correct, the following anomalous situation exists:
If an action presents only claims which were formerly triable to a jury, the right
to jury trial is waived if a jury is requested; while if an action consists only in
part of claims formerly triable to a jury, there is no such implied waiver. See
CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 17 (2d ed. 1947) for a discussion of waiver of jury
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THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL Acr AND GRADED FELONIES
Under the so-called Habitual Criminal Act of Missouri,' certain definite prob-
lems of statutory construction have arisen in respect to mixed or graded felonies,
that is, offenses punishable either by imprisonment in the penitentiary or by
confinement in jail and/or fine. There are three possible situations which might arise
in connection with graded felonies, viz., where the prior crime committed was the
graded offense, where the subsequent, or principal, crime was the graded offense,
and where both the prior and subsequent offenses were graded. The first of these
situations arose in the cases of State v. Brinkley2 and State v. Marshall.8 The
second situation arose first in the case of State v. Ward4 and, more recently, in
the case of State v. Updegraff.5 The third situation has not arisen, although a re-
cent case has covered an almost identical situation so far as the Habitual Criminal
Act is concerned.6
The statute, insofar as applicable to this discussion, provides: "If any person
convicted of any offense punislhable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. . . shall
be discharged, either upon pardon or upon compliance with the sentence, and shall
subsequently be convicted of any offense committed after such pardon or discharge,
he shall be punished as follows: . . .second, if such subsequent offense be such
that, upon a first conviction, the offender would be punished by imprisonment
for a limited term of years, then such person shall be punished by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for the longest term prescribed upon a conviction for such
first offense;. . ." (Italics added.)
Where the prior offense was of the graded nature, it should make no difference
whether the offender was actually punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary,
so long as the offense was one for which the offender could have been punished
by such imprisonment. This is merely the natural meaning of the word "punishable,"
as was well pointed out in the Marshall case.
In the Upldegraff case and in the case of State v. Hacker,7 however, it would
appear that considerable violence has been done in interpreting the wording of the
statute, because, to make the statute applicable to the graded subsequent offense,
it was necessary to interpret the word "punished" in clause "second" as being
"punishable." The Ward case went even further, as in it the court did not
indulge in any discussion of the matter, but merely held that the statute applied
to the situation, upon the basis of the authority of the Brinkley and Marshall
cases. Since there was a distinction between the two situations, these latter cases
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4854 (1939).
2. 354 Mo. 337, 189 S.W. 2d 314 (1945).
3. 326 Mo. 1141, 34 S.W. 2d 29 (1930).
4. 356 Mo. 499, 202 S.W. 2d 46 (1947).
5. 214 S.W. 2d 22 (Mo. 1948).
6. State v. Hacker, 214 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. 1948), wherein the prior offense was
actually punished by confinement in the Intermediate Reformatory for Young
Men.
7. See note 6, supra.
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would not seem to be authority for such a holding. The court, in the Brinkley case,
did mention the situation of the subsequent offense being graded, and said, ' . .Sec.
4854, in clause 'second' thereof does use the word 'punished' instead of the word
'punishable,' which appears everywhere else in the section. But this evidently was
an inadvertence." This slight mention must be considered as obiter dictum be-
cause the subsequent offense in the case was not graded.
The first true discussion by the court of the interpretation of the statute as
applied to the subsequent offense being the graded offense, came in the Updegraff
case. The defendant had previously been convicted of two felonies, grand larceny
and assault with intent to kill with malice. The subsequent offense for which he
was being tried under the Habitual Criminal Act was a violation of the Liquor
Control Act,9 which was a graded offense. Counsel for defendant argued that the
Habitual Criminal Act was not applicable because the subsequent offense was not
one for which "the offender would be punished" by imprisonment for a term of
years. (Italics added.) The court overruled this contention, saying the word
"punished" was put in the bill, instead of the word "punishable," due to an in-
advertence.
Originally, clause "second" read "punishable," but in 1895 the statute was
amended so as to eliminate therefrom the offense of petit larceny, and the enrolled
bill of the amending statute used the word "punished" in clause "second.""' By
referring to the House and Senate Journals, the court decided that there was no
intent to amend the statute in any way other than to eliminate petit larceny and,
therefore, the statute was not amended in any other way; that the word "punished"
was merely a clerical error, which did not defeat the legislative intent.
In saying that the amending statute did not amend the original statute in any
way other than to eliminate petit larceny, the court referred to Corpus Juris.11 This
section does not seem to fit into the pattern of the court's reasoning. American
Jurisprudence seems to make a pertinent point as to whether or not the original
statute was thus amended.12
8. 354 Mo. 337, 375, 189 S.W. 2d 314, 335 (1945). It is interesting to note
that, although clause "third" of the Habitual Criminal Act does use the word
"punishable," the clause refers to punishment for attempts, and in view of clauses
"fourth" and "fifth" of the Attempts statute, punishment for attempts to com-
mit graded felonies cannot extend to imprisonment in the penitentiary. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 4835 (1939).
9. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 4900 (g) (1939).
10. Mo. Laws 1895, p. 153.
11. 59 C.J., Statutes § 66, p. 557. "What Constitutes Amendment. The
striking out or addition of a word, which does not operate to change the law in the
slightest or which makes no material change, does not amount to an amendment,
although it is stricken or added by what may be termed an amendment,..." It
would seem the 1895 bill did change the law materially.
12. 50 AM. Jtm. § 468, p. 482 (1944). "Unless a contrary intent is clearly in-
dicated, the amended statute is regarded as if the original statute had been re-
pealed, and the whole statute re-enacted with the amendment."
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Although it may be proper to refer to outside sources for information to aid
in interpreting some statutes, it seems at least questionable whether it should have
been done in this particular situation. It should be noted that the use of "punished"
does not render the statute ambiguous; the statute makes perfect sense with
"punished" every bit as clearly as if "punishable" had been used. Since the statute
is clear and unambiguous as it reads, there should be no room for going outside the
statute itself in order to interpret it-a point which has been recognized by the
court en banw.'3 Resort may be had to intention of the legislature where the
statute is ambiguous, but where the act is clear the court cannot give effect to such
intent against the express provision of the statute. 4 The exception to this is where
the literal meaning of the statute is absurd."' In view of the use of the word
"punishable" being used in the other clauses of the statute, some doubt might arise
from the use of "punished" in clause "second," but such use hardly seems absurd.
Also, the court has recognized that a preamble can be resorted to only when the
language of the enacting clauses is obscure or ambiguous. 16 Since it is not permis-
sible to refer to even the preamble when the statute is unambiguous, a fortiori,
it should not be permissible to refer to documents entirely outside the statute, there
being no question raised about the legality of the statute. Horack, in his recent
treatise on statutory construction has also pointed out that courts generally refuse
to substitute one word for another where the statute is unambiguous, and also
where there is an ambiguity which affects the essence of the act.' 7
Even if the statute were considered to be ambiguous, the decision of the Up-
degraff case should have been opposite. Statutes which operate to restrain liberty
are to be construed cautiously and strictly;' 8 criminal statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of a defendant and strictly against the state.'9 It is noted that
this doctrine of strict construction has long been a corollary of the principle of
legality applied to criminal law.2 0 The court has previously recognized that the
Habitual Criminal Act is highly penal and said that it should not be extended in
its application to cases which do not by the strictest construction come under its
provisions. 21
It is generally recognized that the purpose of habitual criminal acts is to re-
lieve society, for as long a time as possible, of those persons who have proved
themselves to be incapable of living alongside law-abiding people. In view of this
13. Cf. State ex tel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher, 338 Mo. 622, 92 S.W. 2d
640 (1936).
14. Cf. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Gammon, 73 Mo. 421 (1881).
15. Cf. State ex rel. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Gehner, 316 Mo. 1075,
292 S.W. 1028 (1927); State ex rel. American Mfg. Co. v. Koeln, 278 Mo. 28, 211
S.W. 31 (1919).
16. Cf. Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S.W. 414 (1899).
17. 2 SUTHERLAD, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN § 4925 (3d ed. 1943).
18. 1 WHARTON, CmIMINAL LAW 55 (12th ed. 1932).
19. Cf. State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58, 263 S.W. 95 (1924); State v. Light,
189 S.W. 2d 162 (Mo. App. 1945).
20. HALL, PRINcIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 36 (1947).
21. Cf. State v. Young, 345 Mo. 407, 133 S.W. 2d 404 (1939).
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and in view of the seriousness of some graded felonies, such as assault with intent
to kill, assault with intent to commit robbery, and assault with intent to commit
rape, very probably the court reached a decision which carries out the intent of the
legislature. But the fact remains that the statute has been on the books in its
present form for more than fifty years and one cannot be certain what the legis-
lature did intend. And, since a defendant in a criminal case is to receive the benefit
of any doubt, it would seem that the court has gone too far, even though it may
have thought its holding was a necessary one, because the court has previously
said it is not justified in departing from the natural and unambiguous meaning of
a statute by any consideration of consequences or public policy.22
As interpreted in the Updegraff case, the statute applies to all graded felonies,
and application of the statute to some of the less serious types of offenses might
well be defeating the purpose of the statute as a whole. Consequently, it seems that
the legislature should again consider the statute and possibly give the trial court
some discretion in affixing the punishment of a person convicted under the Act.
GAnnnrr R. CRoucH
INSURER'S LIAILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
There exists among our courts a wide diversity of opinion as to what con-
stitute punitive damages. Coupled with this diversity, and dependent upon it,
is the vexed problem of whether an insurance company should be held liable upon
an insurance contract for punitive damages. This problem may be further sub-
divided into common law punitive damages, for which insurer is liable, and
statutory punitive damages, for which most cases hold insurer is not liable, but for
which, in arguing from analogy on the basis of the case of Huntington v. Attrial,1
insurer should be liable.
The writer of a comparatively recent law review comment 2 said that,
"Although a liability insurance policy may properly encompass damages
resulting from the violation of a criminal statute by the insured, the
general holding is that injuries inflicted intentionally or through wanton
conduct are not within liability insurance coverage. Yet a few courts, em-
phasizing the protection afforded to the injured members of the public,
impose liability upon the insurer even where the injury was wantonly or
intentionally inflicted."
Most states have not enacted legislation governing the problem of enforce-
ment against insurers of the claim of a victim of another's recklessness, although
they seem to have declared by judicial decision that punitive damages may be
assessed against the insurer. For example, in Missouri, when injuries are caused
22. Cf. Betz v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 314 Mo. 390, 284 S.W. 455 (1926);
Lauck v. Reis, 310 Mo. 184, 274 S.W. 827 (1925).
1. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
2. 40 MicH. L. REv. 128 (1941).
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by negligence of an aggravated form, or are "attended by such circumstances as
to be wanton and reckless in character, punitive damages (against the tortfeasor)
are authorized," 8 but it is still left up to the courts to say whether such damages
are within the indemnification coverage of the tortfeasor's insurance policy.
In 1941 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors decided the case of
Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co.4 in which a tortfeasor driver was using a car
with permission of the named insured. The policy applied while the car was
being driven under such circumstances and the insurer paid compensatory dam-
ages of $1744 awarded the injured person. The law of that state permitted the
court to award double or treble damages where the injury inflicted was the result
of a violation of specific statutory rules of the road, and the injury involved was
a result of such a violation. Under the terms of the policy the insurance company
became obligated to pay "all sums which the assured shall become obligated to pay
by reason of liability imposed upon him by law for damages . . . because of
bodily injury." Insurer demurred to plaintiff's complaint for indemnification as
to the additional statutory damages on the ground that the sum sought to be
recovered was awarded as a penalty, or a reward, and not as damages for bodily
injury. The court sustained the demurrer but not without some difficulty. Chief
Justice Maltbie conceded that the insurer would be responsible for punitive
damages assessed against the insured in view of the holding in Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance Co.,' but said that these statutory additional
damages were in the nature of a penalty and Connecticut frowns on penalties,
saying, "The recovery sought in this action is not one based upon a judgment for
punitive damages, but upon the imposition of a penalty." It is questionable
whether the line of demarcation between a penalty and punitive damages is
pronounced enought to make such a distinction.
The court, however, admitted it had in a previous case said that,
"A statute may partake of the nature of both a penal and remedial
statute, and . .. that this statute, in so far as it permitted an individual
to recover damages, was remedial, but that, while not strictly penal, it
was so far of that nature that it should be construed with resonable
strictness.'
Chief Justice Maltbie felt confident that the assessment was a punishment
because the obligation of defentant to pay compensatory damages to plaintiff
for injuries was first fixed, then this award was added to that. I refer to these
remarks because they are all part of the rationalization the court carried on to
justify its intended result of tossing the life line to the insurance company. In the
end the court fell back upon the old standby public policy argument. "A policy
which permitted an insured to recover from the insurer fines (or penalties) im-
3. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F. 2d 58
(C.C.A. 8th 1934). Matter in parentheses inserted by this writer.
4. 127 Conn. 533, 18 A. 2d 357 (1941).
5. Supra, note 3.
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posed for a violation of a criminal law (or public wrong) would certainly be
against public policy,"6 said the learned Justice, and where ". . . the language
of the policy is reasonably open to two constructions, one of which would avoid
such a result, that should be adopted."
There are those who believe that whether the award be in the form of a
penalty, or punitive damages, the same public policy ought to apply to both"
that "Insurance against the punishment intended would defeat the purpose of
the law of punitive damages." 7 There are harsh words in a day when almost every
act of a driver is covered by some sort of a statute. A driver is necessarily
constantly faced with penal damages for violating criminal statutes because of the
minutest of infractions. Moreover, criminal intent is not usually an element of
traffic crimes. Assessments for such violations may be large or small, and are
often awarded to the injured person." If the law did not tend in the direction
of protecting the insured against these penalties for violating criminal statutes then
certainly indemnity would decrease until it was of little value. Allowng pro-
tection to injured persons for criminal violation by insured will not tend to
smooth the path of the criminally inclined as insurance does not protect the
tortfeasor from punishment for his crimes. Yet this must be the reason for the belief
that "insurance against fines and penalties imposed by the criminal would con-
travene public policy."O
There are those who also believe that "damages which are more than com-
pensatory . . . are not necessary for the protection of the injured person."1o It
can well be asked of them, if punitive damages are those beyond which, by
hypothesis, heal the injury, how are we to judge where the line is to be drawn
between compensatory and punitive damages? Perhaps vacillation on this
problem at common law led to awarding punitive damages by statute to the
injured person. United States Circuit Judge Herbert F. Goodrich says that penal
damages "might be taken to indicate anything that a defendant is compelled by
law to pay a plaintiff other than what is necessary to compensate him for a
legal damage done by the defendant,"1 and Professor A. V. Dicey, an English
contemporary of Judge Goodrich's in the field of Conflict of Laws, adds that:
. ..a law . . . is not a penal law merely because it imposes an extra-
ordinary liability on a wrongdoer, in favour of the person wronged, which
is not limited to the damages suffered by him; and an action for enforcing
such liability, by the recovery of the penalty due to the person wronged,
is not a penal action: the essential characteristic .. . is that it should
be an action on behalf of the government or the community, and not an
action for remedying a wrong done to an individual."1 2
6. Matter in parentheses inserted by this writer.
7. Op. cit. supra, note 2.
8. A punitive assessment in the form of the authorization for recovery by
an injured party might well be treated as compensatory damages, as was done in
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
9. Op. cit. supra, note 2.
10. Ibid.
11. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS pp. 213-214 (5th ed. 1932).
12. Dicay, CONFLICT OF LAws pp. 213-214 (5th ed. 1932).
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If a law imposing the liability is not a penal law and the action for enforcing the
liability is not a penal action, then it necessarily follows that the damages assessed
are not penal in nature, and were not so regarded at common law, and therefore
come within the coverage of the policy.
In the case of Minnie L. Adams, Admx. v. Fitchburg Railroad Co.,'$ the intestate
was killed while riding as a passenger on defendant's railroad in Massachusetts.
A Massachusetts statute provided in effect that when a person is killed by a rail-
road corporation in the operation of its railroad, the corporation shall be liable in
damages to the amount of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than five
thousand dollars, which amount is to be assessed with reference to the culpability
of the corporation and to be recoverable in an action by the administrator or ex-
ecutor of the deceased person for the benefit of the widow and next of kin.14 Mr.
Justice Munson, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court of Vermont noted that
the ascertainment of the amount of damages was in the nature of an assessment. Still
he labored with the idea that perhaps if this recovery was to go to the widow
or children, the statute might conceivably be considered remedial, but fearing
the potential amount involved might permit its falling into the hands of more
distant relatives, he finally telescoped his opinion, which held the insurer not liable
for the punitive damages assessed against the insured, into two very important
sentences, which represent one line of thought as to whether damages are punitive
or not.
"The fact that it (referring to the assessment) is given to persons whom
the law would have entitled to share in the estate of deceased cannot
control the construction. A statute may be penal although the entire
amount recovered be given directly to the party injured."'5
In the famous case of Huntington v. Attrl, 16 the United States Supreme
Court expressed a view in conflict with that of Mr. Justice Munson, and the
British Privy Council, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Ontario, followed the
view of the United States Supreme Court on the same facts.17 Attrill, a resident of
Ontario, knowingly signed a fraudulent certificate stating the whole of the capital
stock of a New York corporation, of which he was director, has been paid up. In
so doing he became liable by New York statute for all debts of the company
contracted which included a claim of Huntington. Huntington had loaned the
corporation money prior to Attrill's making this certificate and secured a judgment
against him in the state of New York for same. Huntington then sued Attrill in
13. 67 Vt. 76, 30 Atl. 687 (1894).
14. The personal representative of deceased brought this wrongful death
action in Vermont where jurisdiction over the person of defendant could be procured.
Had this action been brought on a Massachusetts judgment, which was based on
a similar act as here, it might well have been enforced by Vermont court under
the "full faith and credit clause" of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.
15. Matter in parentheses inserted by this writer.
16. Supra, note 1.
17. [1893] A.C. 150.
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Maryland to set aside a transfer of stock in the Equitable Gas Light Company
of Baltimore made by Attrill in fraud of his creditors, and to charge that
stock with payment of his New York judgment. Maryland refused to entertain
this bill because it was a judgment of another state based on a "penalty" and
opposed to the public policy of Maryland. The case came before the Supreme
Court of the United States under the "full faith and credit clause" of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Justice
Gray in the majority opinion-s said that whether a statute of a state was penal
and therefore unenforceable in a sister state,
"depends upon question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against
public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person
injured by a wrongful act.19 . . . The test is not by what name the
statute is called by the legislature or the courts of the State in which it was
passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon
to enforce it to be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an
offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person." 2°
The case indicates one of the ways a court can judicially skin the cat when
there is much complaining about the non-enforcibility of obligations because they fall
by name within a certain classification. This decision indicates that a penal
obligation by another name, as the rose of adage, can smell just as sweet.
Judge Goodrich in speaking of the Huntington v. Attril cases said,
" .. where the action is brought in a second state on the claim arising
in the first, when the claim is alleged to be penal and not reduced to
judgment, can the state court avoid the authority of Huntington v. Attrill.
And, even though state courts are not obliged to follow it, the rule of law
thus announced by the two highest courts of the common law world is of
persuasive if not conclusive authority. '21
No matter how much the courts look with disfavor on this view and despite
George Bernard Shaw's pronouncing that the United States and England are two
countries separated by the same language, certainly we have here the leading
courts of these countries not at all separated by the same language. This lan-
guage might well be interpreted by the insurance companies as a warning as to
the limits of their liability should the case ever come before them or courts which
are prone to listen to them.
I have in mind such courts, as the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
of the 8th Judicial Circuit. In Ohio Casualty Insurawe Company v. Welfare Finance
Company,22 Justice Stone was not of the same opinion as Justice Maltbie was in
the Tedesco case. 23 In speakng for a unanimous court he permitted the injured
plaintiff to recover under a policy worded like the Tedesco case. In this case
insured's servant was backing a truck out of a garage without sufficient clearance
18. Justice Fuller dissented on other grounds.
19. Supra, note 1, 146 U.S. at p. 673.
20. Supra, note 1, 146 U.S. at p. 683.
21. Op. cit, supra, note 11, Sec. 9.
22. Supra, note 3.
23. Supra, note 4.
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on the side upon which Florence Dauster was standing on the running board. This
caused her to be thrown to the ground. $25,000 actual damages and $25,000
punitive damages were sought. $5,500 actual damages and $10,000 punitive dam-
ages were recovered. The policy involved had a $10,000 limit. So the judgment
was settled for $9,000 and costs. The whole case evolved around the insured trying
to recover his judgment obtained for compensatory and punitive damages because
of such injury inflicted by its servant. The court said that the so-called punitive
damages were awarded under Missouri law "not to punish defendant for his offense
but to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries." The insured said it was not
liable for punitive damages as the policy insured only against "accidentally sus-
tained" injuries, and even should the policy have included punitive damages it
would be against public policy. The court was not easily persuaded by the
insurance company. It stated the contention of the insurance company that
punitive damages were not within the meaning and language of the policy was
"not well taken." It said,
"The policy insured 'Against loss by reason of liability imposed by law
upon the assured for damages on account of bodily injuries .. . acci-
dentally sustained. . . .' The basis of the Dauster action was negligence
and nothing more than negligence. Obviously, negligence is covered in the
term of the policy 'Accidentally sustained.' The assessment of punitive
damages was a 'liability imposed by law upon the assured' in connection
with and because of the bodily injuries and the aggravated conduct of
the servant in causing such injuries. . . . Since this policy dearly covers
bodily damage through negligence and since these punitive damages are
not imposed because of the aggravated circumstances or form of this
negligence, such punitive damages must be regarded as coming within the
meaning of the policy."24
The court was progressing nicely until it suddenly remembered the public
policy argument, as did Justice Maltbie, only the latter used it to substantiate his
holding. The insurer contended here that to permit the insured to be covered for
punitive damages is like a person having been tried for a crime, convicted, and
sentenced to confinement in a penitentiary substituting another in his stead. "If
this provision in the policy must be construed as having. . (this). . . effect, it
should be held invalid,"25 said the court. But the court knew that it was the one
which did the construing, and translating into public policy, so it dismissed the
public policy argument by saying the policy was in general terms and "on its face
imports no protection from illegal acts."
The courts seem to be constantly in fear of being thought of as protectors
of the insured from responsibility for his illegal acts. A comment in the Cornell Law
Quarterly26 indicated that Justice Cardozo contended in Messersmitk v. American
Fidelity Co. that liability must be for negligence and not wilfulness because of the
24. Supra, note 3, at p. 59.
25. Supra, note 3. Matter in parentheses inserted by this writer.
26. 22 CoRN. L. Q. 590 (1937). (Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232
N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921).
[Vol. 14
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1949], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/3
principle that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.2 7
However, as I noted earlier, the general analysis of opinion at this date is that just
because the insurer is ultimately liable to indemnify, the insuring itself does not
protect the tortfeasor from responsibility for his crimes. The idea that insurance
is a device to compensate the injured rather than relieve the insured of financial
liability connected with his wrongful acts, seems to be becoming the accepted view.28
Some "host statutes" relating to auto accidents limit recovery to injuries
arising from intentional accidents. Such recovery raises the question whether the
insurer has to answer for the host's misconduct, and, if the contract containing the
words "wilful and wanton" does make the insurer liable for the insured's action,
is the contract valid? This is taking the problem of indemnification to its other
extreme. Some courts perplexed with the problem neatly distinguish between wil-
ful and wanton misconduct. In such cases they contend that wilful misconduct
means "an intention to injure," as distinguished "from 'wanton misconduct' which
is defined as an utter indifference to the right of others, the intention to harm
being absent."29 By such definitibn, insurance against wilful misconduct would be
void under the principle stated above that no one shall be permitted to take advan-
tage of his own wrong. Some courts hold wilful and wanton misconduct is no
more than gross negligence, or that the two names mean the same thing, and
therefore an insurance policy worded against such consequences could be held
valid.80
Such was in effect the holding in the case of American Fidelity & Casualty
Company v. Werfel.31 Graham, while carrying passengers for hire in his cab on the
public streets of Montgomery, Alabama was involved in an accident because of
which a passenger sues for personal injuries. The policy was issued to Graham in
pursuance of a city ordinance requiring it as a condition precedent to a license to
operate his cab within the city limits. The policy, among other things, provided
that ". . .Assured shall not voluntarily assume any liability." The taxicab operator
was assessed punitive damages for the injuries and the court held that such as-
sessment was within the coverage of his policy which indemnified him against loss
from liabilities for injuries imposed by law upon operators of taxicabs used in
the city. The insurer contended such damages were not within the contemplation
of the parties when they entered into this insurance conract, that it had only
agreed to indemnify against loss from liability imposed by law upon the assured,
arising or resulting from claims upon the assured for damages, by reason of the
ownership and use of any of the automobiles described in the policy. Insurer further
contended that ".. .complainant's judgment was for willful or wanton conduct, and
included punitive damages, and that such damages would not be 'on account of
bodily injury' or death within the meaning of the. . . Code.' 32 The bill alleges
27. Id. at p. 593.
28. Id. at p. 595.
29. Id. at p. 594 (American Casualty Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298 (1934).
30. Id.
31. 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (193$).
32. Id. at p. 556.
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that judgment was based on a pleading claiming personal injury damages. The
court said:
"A recovery for a willful or wanton act may be had only where a personal
injury is sustained. The policy, being broad enough to cover a personal
injury or death as a result of an accident occurring while the policy was
in force, was therefore broad enough to cover liability for death,. . . This
recovery would have been for punitive damages purely. It may not be
successfully contended that the policy did not protect against punitive
damages (as well as compensatory damages) for bodily injuries so in-
flicted. That is, under the statutes the injured party assumes the place
of the assured, acquires a 'vested interest' in the nature of an hypothecation
of the right,...,,a
Justice William H. Thomas, in the Werfel case, said, in reference to the case of
George v. Employers Assur. Corp., Ltd.,3 4 that the result of letting an injured person
sue the insurer directly was within reason because "assured, after having had ren-
dered against him and paying a judgment for personal injuries, which included
punitive damage. . (could then) . . have had a recovery from the defendant
casualty company upon the policy."35
It is worth noting in passing that in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones,",
Federal Circuit Judge Thomas F. McAllister of the 6th Judicial Circuit, in
speaking for a unanimous court, affirmed a decision of Federal District Judge
Frank A. Picard. In this case one Jones took out liability insurance to cover
injuries received by anyone while on his property. He later intentionally shot a
man coming on his property because he mistook him for someone else. The court
permitted the injured person to recover from the insurance company saying,
"The vague possibility of benefit to Jones-that some time in the distant
future, when he may have accumulated a sum of money equal to the
amount of the damages assessed against him, he will be saved from pay-
ment of Martin's judgment against him-is too remote, and uncertain to
require that a court hold that such nebulous consequences . . . are
sufficient to void the insurance contract on grounds of public policy
because of a wrongdoer's chance of thus profiting by his own unlawful
act."a37
Here the insurer became bound to pay for all damages assessed against
insured while the "intent" element was present in the insured. The very reason
for punitive damages is the presence of such an intent element whether it be con-
structive or expressed. It seems that although a man cannot recover if he takes out
a policy, he can take out a policy without intention of injuring anyone and may so
intentionally injure him later and the insurer will be liable for indemnification. This
court, if put to the test, should logically grant indemnification for punitive damages
as a result of such act.
33. Ibid. Matter in parentheses inserted by this writer.
34. 219 Ala. 307, 122 So. 175 (1929).
35. Matter in parentheses inserted by this writer.
36. 135 F. 2d 191 (C.C.A. 6th 1943), affirming 45 F. Supp. 887 (1942).
37. 135 F. 2d at p. 195.
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A hindsight view of the cases indicates that it is pretty hard to determine in
advance whether punitive damages are within the coverage of accident liability
policies. If one were to look for the solution in mathematical computation, he
would find as a general rule the insurer is liable for common law punitive damages
and not liable for statutory punitive damages. But there is a definite tendency in
the direction of liability on the part of the insurer for statutory punitive damages.
Courts are not all in agreement because they must depend upon their relative
feelings in respect to the whole picture of the insurance kingdom and its liabilities
in rendering a decison in such a contest rather than stereotyped law. So, as the
law is today, one cannot find the proper solution. The slightest variance in the
facts gives a court cause to follow its personal convictions. An example would
be a set of facts where,
. . . for the guest to recover, the injury must arise from . . . 'reckless dis-
regard of the rights of others' . . . most courts . . . will find that such
injuries are 'accidental' . . . Where, however, the statute requires that the
accident be intentional before the guest has a cause of action... resulting
injuries would not be 'accidental' within the meaning of policy . ..,,
However, even though subject to personalities, where a state has a statute
assessing double or treble damages against a tortfeasor, as in the Tedesco case,3 9
which damages are then awarded to the injured party or assessed on the decree of
culpability of the tortfeasor and given the injured party as in the Adams case,40"
and the court rendering the decision is prone to follow the "persuasive authority" of
the dictum in Huntington v. Attril 4'- and interpret damages to the injured as in
effect being compensatory, the expected result is not a dubious one.
It is quite possible also, that where the injured person is required to procure
a final judgment against the insured before proceeding against the insurer, because
of an express clause in the policy against absolute liability of the insurer, that
his suit on a final judgment when brought against the insurer in its home state,
which will be a state well protected by "insurer" controlled legislation, will
reduce to a domestic decree his judgment for punitive damages and thereby
enforce it within the maginot lines of the lobbyist covered utopias, as was done
in Huntington v. Attrill. Even if the court in the home state of the insurer, doesn't
choose to follow Huntington v. Attrill and enforce a judgment of a foreign state
because it is based on punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court to
which the insured can appeal, will do so. The problem won't be that of a state
enforcing the penal laws of a foreign state since the Supreme Court of the United
States said in Huntington v. Attrill, as I noted earlier, that,
"The test is not by what name the statute is called by the legislature or
the courts of the State in which it was passed, but whether it appears to
the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it to be, in its essential
38. Supra, note 26 at p. 597.
39. Supra, note 4.
40. Supra, note 13.
41. Supra, note 1.
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character and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, or a
grant of a civil right to a private person."42
The result suggested above should be reached despite the belief of Professor
William R. Vance that,
"The terms excepting from the operation of the policy injuries intentionally
inflicted by another are valid, but they will exempt the insurer only when
the injury is not more extensive than the intent with which it wasirnflicted."148
It seems that within the space of ninety years the law has been constantly
in a state of flux in this field. It should be remembered that the court cannot
extract the individual case from the whole picture. Such liability for the in-
surer has two very serious effects. It is undesirable for the insured to become
aware that he is completely covered for punitive, as well as compensatory damages,
for he will quite naturally use a less degree of care in associating among his fellow
men. Very important too is the number of people related to and dependent upon
the insurance world. The business of insurance is one of the world's largest and
most profitable businesses. It is a business intimately associated with the common
good and the economic structure of a country. Subject insurers to punitive
liability -and a prosperous insurance executive of a small insurance firm might
very well be reduced to a "Donegal peddler" over night, if he suddenly finds
that his company's liabilities have increased to limits beyond its capital assets. He
may be fortunate in representing a larger business, which because of its capital
assets is permitted to suffer a little longer before being liquidated into an
infinitesimal speck on a potentially much bespecked judicial scutcheon. However,
even if the insurance business is able to withstand the burden of punitive damages,
the social structure is still affected for the cost of insurance is directly dependent
upon the liability of the company. These are some of the very important factors
running through the mind of the court when considering the problem of the insurer's
liability for penal damages.
However, whether it be social, political, or economic forces at play, it cannot
be denied that the foregoing representative decisions have made quite an inroad
into the now often quoted and over-worked maxim used by Lord Campbell in
Thompson v. Hoppers4 that ". . . the assured cannot seek indemnity for a loss
produced by their own wrongful act." It seems they can, or at least stand in a very
favorable position in attemping to do so.
JAMEs P. AYLWARD, JR.
42. Supra, note 20.
43. VANcE, INSURANCE, § 267 (2d ed. 1930).
44. 119 Eng. Rep. 828, 836 (1856).
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WAIVER OF JURY TRAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
Article I, Section 22 of the 1945 Constitution of Missouri represents a sig-
nificant change from the comparable section: in the Constitution of 1875
which prevailed up until the adoption of the new constitution. It reads in part as
follows:
".. . and that in every criminal case any defendant may, with the
assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of such case
to the court, whose findings shall have the force and effect of a verdict
of a jury."2
No express provision for waiver by the accused of trial by jury existed in any of
the -previous Missouri constitutions.3 In reference to Article I, Section 22 of the
1945 Constitution, the Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of Missouri
has adopted the following rule in the proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure:
"The defendant and the prosecuting attorney, with the assent of
the Court may waive trial by jury and submit the trial of any criminal
cause to the Court, whose findings on all such offenses shall have the
force and effect of the verdict of a jury. Such waiver and assent shall be
in writing, signed by the parties and the judge, and filed of record." 4
Some provision for waiver of jury trial has long been advocated by many
authorities.5 The ability of the accused to waive trial by jury is desirable from
several points of view. The accused may feel, in certain instances, that he
will get a fairer trial before a judge than before "twelve men good and true."
Also, trial by the court would relieve a great deal of the congestion found in
many of the criminal dockets. In some of the larger urban areas such congestion
has become a real problem. Delay in the trial of criminal cases has necessarily
had the effect of impeding civil litigation.
The ability of the accused to waive trial by jury is not as revolutionary as it
sounds at first blush. At least one of the early American colonies recognized such
a right in the codification of their law." In a plea of guilty, the accused, for all
practical purposes, waives the right of trial by jury. It has never been contended
1. Mo. CONST. Art. II, § 28 (1875).
2. Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 22.
3. Mo. CONST. Art. XIII, § 8 (1820), Mo. CONsT. Art. I, § 17 (1865),
Mo. CONsT. Art. II, § 28 (1875).
4. Rules of Criminal Procedure for Courts of Missouri for adoption by
the Supreme Court of Missouri, Rule 26.01 (h) (June 30, 1948).
5. "Waiver has been more frequently and more strongly recommended than
almost any other reform in criminal procedure. It was one of the four chief
points in the criminal law program of the American Bar Association in 1934."
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 391-392 (1947).
6. "In all actions at law, it shall be the liberty of the plaintiff and defendant,
by mutual consent, to choose whether they shall be tried by the bench or by a
jury. . . . The like liberty shall be granted to all persons in criminal cases."
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, Art. 29.
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that such procedure was improper or unconstitutional.7 Many jurisdictions,
whose constitutions contain no express provision for waiver of trial by jury, have
held by judicial determination that the accused, even in a felony case, may waive
trial by jury.8 These jurisdictions, in so holding, have done so upon the theory
that the constitutional provision which guarantees trial by jury in criminal
proceedings is a privilege conferred upon the accused; being a privilege, the ac-
cused may waive it if he sees fit. On the other hand, jurisdictions operating
under similar constitutional provisions have held that the accused in a felony case
may not waive the right to trial by jury. The conclusion of these courts is usually
predicated upon one of 'two theories. One such theory is based upon public
policy 9 while the other is based upon the proposition that witbout a jury the
court lacks jurisdiction to try the matter.10
Section 4052 of the Revised Statutes of MissouriLL provides that the ac-
cused in a misdemeanor case may waive trial by jury. Prior to the adoption of
the 1945 Constitution, the law in Missouri was otherwise in respect to felony
cases. '12 A survey of these Missouri cases brings one to the conclusion that the
basis for denying the accused in a felony case the right to waive trial by jury
has not been too clearly enunciated. In State v. Mansfield,1 3 decided in 1867,
the court talks in terms of lack of jurisdiction and also in terms of public policy.
The real reason behind the Missouri decisions first comes to light in the case of
State v. Talken,14 decided in 1927. Although the court there referred to the
language of State v. Mansfeld, 15 in addition it cited Section 4005 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri (1919) which read:
"All issues of fact in any criminal cause shall be tried by a jury, to be
selected, summoned and returned in a manner prescribed by law."
7. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892); Bugg v. United States, 140
F. 2d 848 (C.C.A. 8th 1944); Hood v. United States, 152 F. 2d 431 (C.C.A. 8th
1946); State v. Kellar, 332 Mo. 62, 5.5 S.W. 2d 969 (1932).
8. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); State ex rel. Warner v.
Baer, 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N.E. 786 (1921); Commonwealth ex rel. Ross v.
Egan, 281 Pa. 251, 126 Atl. 488 (1924); People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N.E.
722 (1930).
9. Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
10. Territory v. Ah Wah and Ah Yen, 4 Mont. 149, 47 Am. Rep. 341 (1881).
11. "But the defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the
court, may submit the trial of misdemeanors to the court, whose finding in all
such offenses shall have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury." Mo. Rv.
STAT. § 4052 (1939).
12. Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498 (1847); Cousineau v. State, 10 Mo. 501(1847); State v. Moody, 24 Mo. 560 (1857); State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470(1867) (felony case and the accused consented to be tried by a jury of eleven);
State v. Sanders, 243 S.W. 771 (Mo. 1922); State v. Talken, 316 Mo. 596, 292
S.W. 32 (1927); State v. Bresse, 326 Mo. 885, 33 S.W. 2d 919 (1930).
13. "His right to be tried by a jury of twelve men is not a mere privilege; it
is a positive requirement of the law. . . .Aside from the illegality of such a pro-
cedure, public policy condemns it." State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470, 478 (1867).
14. Supra, note 12.
15. Supra, note 13.
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Similar statutory provisions have been a part of the codified law of Missouri
from 1834 up to the present date.1 6 It seems proper to regard such a provision
as excluding the jurisdiction of the court, without a jury, to try such issues.
While the earlier Missouri cases make no reference to similar statutes,17 their
decisions become more reconcilable by knowledge of the existence of such statutes.
The adoption of the rule that the accused may waive trial by jury raises
certain other problems. First, may the accused in a felony case consent to
be tried by a jury of less than twelve? In other words, does the ability of the
accused to waive trial by jury altogether likewise confer upon him the right
to consent to a trial by a jury composed of less than twelve men? The courts
have long held that the constitutional provision which guarantees trial by jury
means a jury by twelve men. s Notwithstanding, many courts have held that
the accused, even in a felony case, may consent to be tried by a jury of less
than twelve. The Supreme Court of Iowa, which has denied the accused in a
felony case the right to waive trial by jury, 9 has nevertheless allowed the
accused to consent to be tried by a jury of less than twelve and held the con-
viction valid.20 The Iowa court points out in State v. Kaufman2 ' that there
may be instances where it is desirable for the accused to consent to be tried
by a jury of less than twelve. One such instance is where the accused may feel that
his witnesses may not be available if the trial is delayed. Other jurisdictions,2"
in allowing the accused in a felony case to consent to be tried by a jury of less
than twelve, have done so upon a different theory. These courts reason that if
the accused is permitted to completely waive trial by jury, then it necessarily
follows that he should be able to consent to a trial by less than twelve jurors.
Essentially, the two are the same. In People v. Scuderi, the Supreme Court of
Illinois said:
"It must follow that, if the laws of this state permit a defendant in a
criminal case to stipulate a waiver of his right to be tried by an entire
jury, he may also with equal effect waive one or more jurors, and enter
into a stipulation with the people, whereby he and the people and the
trial court agree and consent to the trial proceding with a jury composed of
less than twelve men." 22
16. Mo. REv. STAT. Art. VI, § 1 (1834-35), Mo. REv. STAT. c. 138, § 1
(1845), Mo. REV. STAT. c. 127, Art. VI, § 1 (1855), Mo. GEN. STAT. c. 213 § 1
(1866), Mo. REv. STAT. § 1889 (1879), Mo. REV. STAT. § 4189 (1889), Mo. REv.
STAT. § 2608 (1899), Mo. REV. STAT. § 5212 (1909), Mo. REV. STAT. § 4005 (1919),
Mo. REv. STAT. § 3662 (1929), Mo. REv. STAT. § 4051 (1939).
17. Supra, note 16.
18. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
19. State v. Carman, 63 Iowa, 130, 18 N.W. 691 (1884).
20. State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa, 578, 2 N.W. 275 (1879); State v. Grossheim,
79 Iowa 75, 44 N.W. 541 (1890); State v. Browman, 191 Iowa 608, 182 N.W.
823 (1921).
21. Supra, note 20.
22. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); People v. Scudieri, 363 Ill.
84, 1 N.E. 2d 225 (1936); Ex parte Kortgaard, 267 N.W. 438 (N.D. 1936); State
v. Sackett, 39 Minn. 69, 38 N.W. 773 (1888); Attorney General ex rel. O'Hara v.
Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936).
23. People v. Scudieri, 363 11. 84, at 87, 1 N.E. 2d 225, at 227 (1936).
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This statement is particularly applicable to the situation as it exists in Missouri.
It could be argued that under the constitutional provision 24 the accused's con-
sent to trial by a jury of less than twelve in a felony case is invalid. As an
alternative to trial by jury it is provided that the accused may consent to trial
by the court. At common law a jury was composed of twelve men.25 The pro-
vision is silent as to consent to trial by the jury of less than twelve. Strictly
construed, the provision seems to grant an accused two alternatives: trial by
jury or trial by the court. However, upon the reasoning of the cases previously
cited,2 6 this argument should be rejected. In State v. Mansfield=T the Supreme
Court of Missouri seems to indicate that waiver of trial by jury and consent to
be tried by a jury of less than twelve are, for all practical reasons, alike.
In any analysis of this question with respect to Missouri law, mention also
should be made of the first part of Article I, Section 22 of the 1945 Constitution.2 8
The part referred to grants to the state legislature the authority to prescribe by
legislative enactment that a jury of less than twelve shall meet the requirements
of a constitutionally composed jury, in courts not of record. The logical inter-
pretation of this section would seem to be that it is a limitation upon the power
of the legislature to change the constitutionally accepted number of jurors,
except in cases cognizable in courts not of record. It does not follow that, since
the legislature is prohibited from changing the size of the traditional jury, the
accused himself may not consent to a jury of less than twelve. In short, while
the provision places a limitation upon legislative power, it in no way indicates
that a jury of less than twelve, if consented to by the accused, could not render
a valid verdict.
Rule 23 (B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly states
that the parties may consent to a jury of less than twelve.
A second problem concerns consent of the state to a waiver. Rule 26.01 (b)
of the proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure2 o reads in part as follows:
"The defendant and the prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the
Court may waive trial by jury . . ."
By way of anticipation, does this mean that the state may withhold its
consent to the accused's waiver of trial by jury? In other words, does the state
have the right to demand trial by jury? Certainly the constitutional provision80
with reference to which the rule was promulgated gives no hint or indication of
such a right vested in the state. The problem anticipated here confronted the
24. Mo. CONsT. Art. I, § 22.
25. Supra, note 18.
26. S-upra, note 22.
27. Supra, note 12.
28. "That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate; provided that a jury for the trial of criminal and civil cases in courts
not of record may consist of less than twelve citizens as may be prescribed by
law, .. .." Mo. CONsT. Art. I, § 22.
29. Sutpra, note 4.
30. Mo. CONsT. Art. I, § 22.
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Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of People v. Scornavacte.3s The majority
of the court held that the accused could not waive trial by jury over the ob-
jection of the state attorney. Justice DeYoung entered a vigorous dissenting
opinion, stating in part:
"The power of a person accused of a criminal offense to waive his
right to a jury trial is conceded in the opinion. To declare, as the majority
does, that the prosecution's consent is necessary to make such a waiver
effective is inconsistent with the defendant's acknowledged power, enables
the state to nullify his act and reduces his power to waive a jury trial to
a shadow."32
It is not difficult to visualize situations where the accused may well prefer to
lay his case before a deliberate and cool headed judge rather than before an
impassioned jury. Such a situation may arise where the accused is a member of
a minority political, racial, or religious group, or where the case contains intri-
cate questions of fact. Is it just to foreclose the accused from choosing to
have his case tried by a judge, rather than by a jury, by virtue of the fact that the
state refused to give its consent to a waiver of trial by jury? If such be true, the
jury becomes a tool of conviction rather than a safeguard to the accused.3 3 It
seems appropriate to point out in this connection that the American Law
Institute's proposed Code of Criminal Procedure makes not even the slightest
suggestion that the state's consent is required before the accused may effectively
waive trial by jury.34 Rule 23 (A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proced-
ure35 is similar to proposed Missouri Rule 26.01 (b). Unquestionably the Federal
Rule was based on a dictum of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Patton v. United States.8 It should be pointed out that the Patton case is not
binding on the courts of Missouri in respect to this particular procedural question.
31. People v. Scomavache, 347 Ill. 403, 179 N.E. 909 (1931).
32. Supra, note 31, at 915.
33. 'Hall, Has the State a Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases? 18 A.B.
A.J. 226, 227 (1932), commenting on People v. Scornavache, supra, note 31,
"The defendant's contention that there are many situations where an accused per-
son prefers trial by a judge rather than by jury was met by the statement that
the accused has a right to a change of venue. But this is certainly no comfort in
a case where, because of the type of defendant, the nature of the crime, the pub-
licity given it, or the complexity of the facts, the accused has every reason to
prefer the judgment of an enlightened individual to that of any jury. It is irony
indeed, that in such a situation, the tribunal which for centuries was regarded
as the safeguard and protection of the accused, can now under the Illinois decision
be employed by the State to facilitate conviction."
34. CODE oF CRIMINAL PocEDURE (American Law Institute, 1930), Sec. 266:
"In all cases except where a sentence of death may be imposed trial by a jury may
be waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall be made in open court and entered
of record." (Committee also suggests that if provisions are made for more than one
judge sitting on the trial, then waiver should be allowed even in cases where penalty
of death may be imposed.)
35. FEDE-AL RuLE oF CRiMiNAL PRocEDuRE, Rule 23 (A): "Cases requir-
ing to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury
trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the government."
36. Supra, note 8.
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If consent of the state is necessary to effect a valid waiver on the part of
the accused, just what is required of the state in this respect? Two interesting
cases in connection with this point arose in California. The California State
Constitution provided that trial by jury might be waived in all criminal cases
by the consent of both parties.37  In People v. Thompso 3 s the accused on
appeal contended that there had been no effective waiver of trial by jury, by
reason of the fact that the state had not waived such, and that the trial by the
court was error. The court held that since the defendant himself was willing
to waive a jury, he could not be deemed to be prejudiced by the failure of the
prosecuting attorney to join in such waiver, and any error in relation thereto
could not be urged by the defendant. In People v. Rumsey8" the California
court said that they would imply a waiver on the part of the state from the
sent presence of the state at the time the accused consented to trial by the
court.
The wording of Article I, Section 22 of the Missouri Constitution 4 and Rule
26.01 (b) of the proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure41 clearly state that the
court must give it's consent before any waiver by the accused becomes effective.
That is as it should be. Imposed upon the trial judge is the duty to see that
the trial is conducted in such a manner as to preserve for the accused the safe-
guards the law gives him. An essential safeguard is the right to trial by jury.
This safeguard should be zealously guarded. The Supreme Court pf the United
States in Patton v. United States42 emphasizes the solemn duty resting on the
trial judge when confronted with the problem of whether or not to accept an
accused's waiver of trial by jury.
Ronald Lee Somerville
37. "A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent
of both parties, expressed in open court by defendant and his counsel . . ." CALIF.
CONST. Art. I, § 7.
38. People v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 2d 965, 108 Pac. 2d 105 (1940).
39. People v. Rumsey, 127 Cal. App. 272, I Pac. 2d 780 (1932).
40. Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 22.
41. Supa, note 4.
42. Supra, note 8.
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